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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF u·TAH 
J. B. & R. E. WALKER, INC., et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-





Certiorari to the Industrial Conunission of Utah to 
review an order granting death benefits under the Utah 
Compensation Act, to the surviving widow and minor 
child of John Robert Dukes, deceased. The facts of the 
case are substantially without dispute. They are estab-
lished principally by the testimonies of two employees of 
the plaintiff employer, and may be summarized as fol-
lows: 
Deceased was employed by J. B. and R. E. Walker, 
Inc., a Utah Corporation, engaged in the sand and gravel 
business, and hereinafter designated as Walker (R. 1, 9, 
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10). At the time of his employment, he had no particular 
knowledge of machinery, and he was neither qualified 
nor employed to operate any type of machinery (R. 10, 
14, 24, 26). Dukes' title or assignment "Tas as "helper to 
the plant operator" (R. 9, 10). His general duties, as 
such, were to keep the plant cleaned up, and to help lubri-
cate the machinery (R. 10). He also might be assigned 
special duties by the plant operator (R. 10, 11). 
As part of the equipment u.sed by Walker in it:3 
operations was a machine designated as a Hough Loader 
(R. 11). It was a machine mounted on four wheels, with 
a scoop on the front, and which could be used to lift loads 
of gravel or sand from ground level up into a truck (R. 
11). Although its general operation was somewhat simi-
lar to that of an ordinary automobile, there were some 
important differences, and because of certain peculiari-
ties of the machine, its operation presented considerably 
more danger than the operation of an ordinary auto-
mobile. (R. 11, 13). Such peculiarities included the fol-
lowing: (1) The wheels had short centers and would react 
quicker and turn in tighter circles (R. 11). (2) Depres-
sion of the brake pedal would have the effect of disengag-
ing the driving gears, an effect similar to the depression 
of a clutch pedal on an ordinary passenger automobile 
( R. 12). ( 3) Failure to apply full throttle would take 
away part of the po,ver steering, 1naking the machine 
Jllore difficult to control (R. 12-13). (4) The machine 
was also top heavy, and therefore could easily be tipped 
over, especially on uneven ground (R. 1!). In Walker's 
opt~rations the 1naehine \v,as used for loading trucks and 
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was used in three different general plant areas, all of 
which were at different levels or elevations. Thus it was 
necessary from time to time to move it from one portion 
or area of the plant to another (R. 12, 13). 
One of Walker's employees was regularly .assigned 
to the operation of this machine, and he operated it about 
90% of the time (R. 14-15, 17). However, the general 
supervisor, J.\tlr. Reed, and several of the other en1ployees 
(of whom Dukes wa.s not one), were trained and qualified 
to operate it, and one of such persons could and did oper-
ate it in the .absence of the regular operator (R. 17-18). 
Besides the machine above described, Walker had 
various other types of machinery which were used in its 
operations. It was the usual practice of Walker to train 
all employees to operate all of the machines, so that each 
could perform .any of the duties which might be required 
of them. Dukes had been promised that he would be 
taught to operate the various machines, including the 
Hough Loader, (R. 15, 19), but up to the time of the 
accident here involved, he had never received any train-
ing whatsoever in its operation (R. 15, 20-21), except that 
on one Sunday the supervisor, Mr. Reed, had given him 
sufficient instructions that he could drive it up the hill 
(R. 14, 16, 17). Dukes had also w.anted to take the ma-
chine downhill on that same occasion, but had been spe-
cifically told by Reed not to take it downhill-that it was 
too dangerous. The exact testimony of Reed on this 
point is as follows : 
"Q. At that time did you give him any instruction 
about taking the machine down the hill~ 
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A. He wanted to bring it down that day, and I 
told him no, that it was too dangerous. He 
didn't know enough about it." (R. 14). 
Reed also told him not to get on the machine until 
he had learned to operate it: 
"Q. Did you tell him anything about getting into 
it or attempting to operate it~ 
A. I told him that until he learned about it not 
to get on it." (R. 14). 
Reed also promised Dukes that he would eventually 
be taught to operate the loader: 
"Q. Did you ever have any general discussion 
with Johnny Dukes about his being taught to 
operate this Hough loader at some time~ 
A. Yes. I told him that if he would stay with the 
company, and work ~s he had been doing, 
why that he would eventually learn how to 
run the equipment, but that it just couldn't be 
done as quickly as he wanted it done. 
Q. Did you tell him, with reference to the Hough 
loader, that he \Yould receive instructions in 
the operation of that "Then there \vas an op-
portunity to do so~ 
A. That's right." (R. 15). 
1-Io\vever, up to the ti1ne of the fatal accident, Dukes 
}tad never received nn~T further training on the 1nachine, 
and had nevt>r been authorized to operate it (R. 14). 
( )n l\ I ay 11, \Yhieh \Yas a Saturday, the plant was not 
opP rating, but a ~ort of skeleton ere\\'" \Yns doing 1nain-
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tenance work (R. 16). Dukes had been detailed by Reed 
to work that day as "scale 1nan." Hi.s duties were to 
weigh trucks which came in for loads of sand or gravel 
(R. 16). He was also directed to render any assistance 
requested by Jim Batt, vvho was working with troughing 
idlers on .a conveyor belt (R. 16, 24). 
On the afternoon of that date, a truck came in for a 
load of material. Dukes observed that the Hough Loader 
vvhich vvould be used to load the truck, was not at that 
level. Duke.s said he would go up to the upper level and 
get the loader and bring it down (R. 25). At that time 
Dukes was working with Batt, but Batt did not tell him 
to go get the loader, nor did he order him not to get the 
loader (R. 25). He merely inquired whether Dukes had 
ever operated the loader before and Dukes replied in the 
affirmative (R. 25, 30). At that time Mr. Reed and two 
other men, properly qualified to operate the loader were 
at the plant, and any of them could have brought the 
loader down from the upper level to the lower level (R. 
17). In fact it had been the intention of Mr. Reed to take 
the loader down to the proper plant level when he com-
pleted checking some vvork with some welders (R. 22). 
:;\Ir. Batt was also qualified to operate it and could have 
brought it down (R. 17, 18, 26). 
Two or three minutes after Dukes left to get the 
loader, Batt, being concerned as to Dukes' ability to 
operate it, drove a truck up to the upper level and ar-
rived there just as Dukes was starting up the loader (R. 
25-26). Again Batt inquired whether he had "run it," 
to which Dukes replied, "Hell, yes." (R. 26). Dukes sig-
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nailed Batt to precede him down the mountain, but Batt 
refused to do so (R. 26). Dukes started down the moun-
tain and almost immediately overturned the loader, sus-
taining injuries to himself which proved to be fatal (R. 7). 
The surviving widow and minor child of the de-
ceased Dukes duly filed their application for compensa-
tion benefits (R. 1) and a hearing thereon was held by 
the Commission. Thereafter, the Commission entered its 
order, in favor of the applicants .and awarding death 
benefits to them (R. 45-46). In its decision, the Commis-
sion specifically recognized that decedent had been in-
structed not to operate the loader until he had been 
taught to do so (R. 45). The Commission also recognized 
the real and sole issue in the case : 
"Assuming that deceased was instructed not 
to oper.ate the loader until he had learned how to 
operate it and as.suming that he had not learned 
how to operate it as of ~1ay 11, 1957, was deceased 
guilty of a departure from hi.s enzployment or did 
he negligently perform a duty which he was per-
mitted to do." (Emphasis ours.) (R. 45). 
H.aving recognized the real issue the Co1mnission 
then proceeded into the '\Yilderness and occluded that is-
sue by throwing up a s1noke screen of false issues, as, 
for exan1ple, "who ",.as to teach him when and how~ Who 
,vas to detern1ine ",.hen he '\Yas qualified~" Certainly these 
are responsibilities 'vhich '\Yould rest 'vith the employer. 
It is not for the en1ployee to determine 'vhen he is quali-
fied to use the en1ployer~s 1nachinery. The Commission 
nl~o SP\'lllS to haYe been influenced by the fac.t that Batt 
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did not order the deceased not to operate the loader, 
although there is nothing in the record to indicate that 
Batt had any authority to restrain him from so doing. 
The record is clear beyond question that deceased 
had been specifically instructed not to use the lo.ader 
until he had been properly instructed in its operation, and 
the Commission so found the fact to be (R. 15-16). The 
record is equally clear that there were dangers inherent 
in the operation of the machine, which made it advisable 
for Walker to re.strict its operation to those properly 
trained and qualified to do so. The applicants made no 
effort whatsoever to shoulder the burden of proof cast 
on them by law. No evidence was offered to suggest that 
Dukes was ever authorized, even by implication, to oper-
ate the machine. All of the evidence in the record comes 
from vValker's employees. All of it is to the effect that 
decedent had been specifically prohibited from operating 
the machine. Yet, in the f.ace of such a record, the Com-
mission found that deceased was killed within "the scope 
of his employment." (R. 46). 
A petition for re-hearing was duly filed by the plain-
tiffs herein (R. 47), and said petition was duly denied 
(R. 48). Thereafter on petition of plaintiffs herein (R. 
49), this court duly issued its writ of certiorari to the 
Commission ( R. 52). 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
POINT I 
THE DECEASED, JOHN ROBERT DUKES, BY AT-
TEMPTING TO OPERATE HIS EMPLOYER'S MACHINE, 
IN VIOLATION OF INSTR.UCTIONS, DEPARTED FROM 
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"THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT" AND THEREFORE 
HIS DEATH WAS NOT COMPENSABLE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECEASED, JO·HN ROBERT DUKES, BY ATL• 
.TEMPTING TO OPERATE HIS EMPLOYER'S MACHINE~ 
IN VIOLATION OF INSTRUCTIONS, DEPARTED FROM 
"THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT" AND THEREFORE 
HIS DEATH WAS NOT COMPENSABLE. 
We recognize, of course, that the evidence, and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom must he viewed in the 
light most f.avorable to the applicants; that the compen 
sation act must be construed liberally in favor of the 
applicants, and that all doubts must he resolved in favor 
of the validity of the proceedings below. Conceding these 
points, as we must, and in light of those principles, we 
proceed to a consideration of the serious legal question 
involved. 
The court's problen1 is not one of exa1nining the 
record to determine whether there is any evidence to 
support the findings of the connnission. The evidence 
is .all one 'vay, and the Con11nission found in accordance 
,vith it, that the deceased en1ployee had been instructed 
not to use the 1narhine until he had been instructed in its 
operation. The con1n1ission concluded, for reasons not 
Pntirely clear, that deceased 'vhile atten1pting to operate 
the n1aehine, in direet violation of his en1ployer's orders, 
\Yas acting \rithin the course of his e1nployn1ent. That 
conclusion is not the finding of an ultimate fact, but 
ratht\r a conrlnsion of la,v, going to the very jurisdiction 
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of the Commission. As it has sometimes been put, per-
haps inaccurately, this is the determination of a juris-
dictional fact. It is, however, a matter for review by this 
Court. For, if deceased, as a matter of law was not 
engaged in the course of his employment, the Commis-
sion has no jurisdiction of the matter. 
The principle that thi.s court will review the juris-
dictional facts and \veigh them independently of the 
Commission, see1ns to have been established in the case 
of Ind~tstrial Con~m. v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825. 
This was one of the first cases decided under the Work-
men's Compensation Act in this jurisdiction. It has been 
consistently followed since that time. 
Angel v. Ind. Comm., 64 Utah 105, 288 P. 509; 
Luker Sand & Gravel Co. v. Ind. Comm., 82 
Utah 188, 23 P. (2d) 225; 
Weber County-Ogden City Relief Committee 
v. Ind. Comm., 93 Utah 85, 71 P. (2d) 
177; 
Holt v. Ind. Comm., 96 Utah 484, 87 P. (2d) 
686; 
Miller v. Ind. Comm., 97 Utah 226, 92 P. (2d) 
342; 
Stover Bedding Co. v. Ind. Comm., 99 Utah 
423, 107 P. (2d) 1027; 
Rosenbaum v. Ind. Comm., 112 Utah 109, 185 
P. (2d) 511; 
Christean v. Ind. Con~m., 113 Utah 45, 196 
P. (2d) 502; 
Sommerville v. Ind. Comm., 113 Utah 504 196 
P. (2d) 718. ' 
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The particular problem presented in this case, is 
whether the deceased by undertaking to operate his en1-
ployer's Hough Loader in direct violation of the instruc-
tions which he had received from his superior, departerl 
from the scope of his employment, so as to take the acci-
dent out of the operation of the Compensation Act, or 
whether in disobeying his employer's orders, he was 
merely guilty of negligence, which would not affect the 
rights of his dependents to death benefits under the act. 
The Utah Act is silent as to the effect of a violation by 
an employee of rules or regulations of his employer. This 
is likewise true of the Compensation Acts of many of our 
sister states. The problem here presented is not novel 
to this court, and it has been treated judicially by the 
courts of many other states, and especially states which 
are heavily industrialized, and where problems of Work-
mens' Compensation frequently come before the court. 
We shall consider first, the decisions from other juris-
dictions to set the stage for the treatment of the pre-
cedents of this court. 
The authorities are in general agree1nent that 'vhere 
the prohibition relates merely to the rnauner of doing 
an authorized or required 'vork, a violation on the part 
of the e1nployee amounts to nothing 1nore than negligence, 
\vhieh is not ,a defense under the Con1pensation Act, and 
t ht>refore, recovery is pern1itted. Ho,vever, \Yhere the 
reo-ulation is not direeted to the Inanner of perforn1ing b . 
t hP ,vork, but rather is directed to,vard li1niting or de-
fining- the 1rork f:o be accon1 pl ished, a violation on the 
part 0 [' the Plllployee in engaging in a prohibited activity 
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arnounts to a departure from the course of his employ-
nlent, and an injury sustained at such time, under well 
settled principles, is not compensable. The rules are 
well stated in Vol. 1, Larson's Workmen's Compensa 
tion Law, Sec. 31.00, page 457, as follows: 
"When misconduct involves a prohibited over-
stepping of the boundaries defining the ultimate 
work to be done by the claimant, the prohibited 
act is outside the course of employment. But when 
rnisconduct involves .a violation of regulations or 
prohibitions relating to method of accomplishing 
that ultimate work, the act remains within the 
course of employment." 
Follovving the statement of the rule, in the textual 
discussion, the author cites many illustrations of cases 
where the rule has been applied. 
In Kasper v. Liberty Foundry Co., (Mo. App.), 54 
S.W. (2d) 1002, a moulder, in violation of express orders 
of his employer, went into the grinding room, .and at-
tempted to do grinding work. A piece of emery flew into 
his eye, injuring it, for which he sought compensation. 
In denying compensation, the court said: 
"If the employee is injured in the doing of 
sornething outside the regular duties for which he 
is employed, but which is not wholly beyond and 
disassociated from his employment proper, and 
tends ultimately to react to the employer's benefit, 
then, absent any question of the effect of the vio-
lation of a positive order not to have done such 
act, he is quite natur.ally to be held to have been 
injured by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment. But the employer does 
have the undoubted right to limit the scope of 
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his servant's employment. In the very nature of 
things, work falls into different cla.ssifications, 
some of which anyone may safely perform no 
matter how little his ability, but others of which 
are attended with risks and haz.ards which can 
be avoided only by those equipped with the requi-
site skill and experience to meet them. The recog-
nition of this fact is required in the proper organi-
zation of any industrial plant, not only for the 
sake of efficiency with which we as a court are 
not so much concerned, but equally for the very 
important purpose of guarding .against accident, 
and injury which do bring the Compensation Act 
into play. Consequently an employee should not 
be permitted to intermeddle by his own violation 
with something entirely outside of the work for 
which he is employed, and then, when injured 
while so doing, to claim and receive compensation 
upon the plea that his act was designed for tlz e 
gain of his employer as well." (Emphasis ours.) 
On rehearing, the .applicant argued that the provi-
sions of a Missouri statute providing for a reduction of 
15% of the an1ount of the a\vard \Vhere the en1ployee 
had violated orders, had been overlooked, and that the 
statute clearly indicated that a violation of orders \vould 
not result in defeating con1pensation. In rejecting this 
position, the same court said, con11nencing at page 1006 
of 54 s.,-v. (2d) : 
'~In other ''Tords, if there is no question about 
the e1nployee haYing acted \Yithin the scope of hi~ 
P1nploy1nent~ though he 1nay haYe done an au-
thori~Pd net in a forbidden 111anner, he is never-
thPle~~ entitled to co1npensation: but the statute 
ha.s 110 application to the case 'lchere the enzployee 
goes nutl"''ide the duties for 'lrllich he -is en1ployed 
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and is injured while so doing, since to interpret 
the statute in that manner would have the effect 
of leaving it to the employee to select his own 
"'~ork, regardless of what the wishes of the em-
ployer might be, subject only to his compensation 
being reduced 15% for an injury received while 
he was acting in violation of the limitations fixed 
by his employer." (Emphasis ours.) 
In Holloway v. Ideal Seating Co., 313 Mich. 267, 211 
N. vV. (2d) 125, a helper to a punch press operator was 
injured \\Thile operating the machine contrary to his em--
ployer's express instructions to leave all machines alone .. 
The Supreme Court of Michigan carefully reviewed the 
other decisions of that court, citing and quoting many 
cases illustrating the general rule. It quoted from 
Bischoff v. An~erican Car & Foitndry Co., 190 ~{ich. 229, 
157 ~.\V. 13, a.s follows: 
"The rule is sound. It Inay be modified in the 
case of an emergency or in other special circum-
stances. But, fundamentally, the option is not in 
the employee to extend the course of his e1npZoy· 
1nent upon the sole ground that his act m.ay be for 
the employer's benefit. An eniployer has the right 
to prescribe the duties of an employee. If work 
is hazardous, he must have the ri.rJht to protect 
hitnself against liability for accident by selecting 
competent persons to do it. Employees may not 
impose liability upon the employer by leaving the 
work they were hired to do and voluntarily and 
without his knowledge or acquiescence doing 
something else." (Emphasis ours.) 
The court concluded that the accident did not arise 
out of the claimant's employ1nent within the meaning 
of the above rule, and therefore compensation was denied 
.A. series of New York cases, well illustrate the rule .. 
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In Rendina v. Continental Can Company, 226 N.Y. 565, 
123 N.E. 886, the claimant was employed by the defendant 
to dip cans in a liquid. On the day of the accident, after 
finishing his own work, he attempted to operate a stamp-
ing machine in violation of orders and sustained an in-
jury for which he sought compensation. In Burch v. 
Rampano Iron Works, 210 App. Div. 506, 206 N.Y.S. 868, 
an employee whose duty it was to operate an air hammer 
undertook to pull an iron clamp from a furnace in viola-
tion of specific instructions. In so doing he sustained an 
injury for which he sought compensation. In Hyatt v. 
U.S. Rubber Reclaiming Co., 256 N.Y. 571, 177 N.E. 144, 
the claimant was a foreman in the tube department of a 
rubber reclaiming business. In violation of orders, he 
undertook to saw a board with a circular rip saw in the 
mechanical department. While so doing, he received an 
injury for which he sought compensation. In each of 
these three cases, the court held that the employee had 
departed from the course of his employment, and denied 
compensation. 
In Kensington Steel Corp. v. Industrial Cornm., 385 
Ill. 504, 53 N .E. ( 2d) 395, a truck driver attempted to re--
pair a steel 1nill, believing it to be in need of repair, but 
when in fact it \Vas not, and no e1nergency existed. The 
Illinoi~ SuprenH? Court held, in accordance \vith the rule 
above stated, that the e1nployee had departed from the 
seopP of his rinploynH?nt. A sin1ilar holding 'v.as reached 
in Shofj'lcr Y. Lelli.oli TTalley Coal Co .. 290 Pa . .J-SO, 139 
A. 1 !l~, \vher(~ n 8pragger at defendanfs coal 1nine at 
t.c1nptPd to OJH~rnte a. locon1otive " ... hich \vas in violation 
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not only of his employer's rules, but also of state statute. 
And in Cohen v. Birmingham Fabricating Co., 224 Ala. 
67, 139 So. 97, defendant's sales manager was killed while 
unloading steel in violation of his employer's instructions. 
It was held that he was not in the course of his employ-
ment. 
A case somewhat novel on its facts is Black v. Town 
of Springfield, 217 S.C. 413, 60 S.E. (2d) 854. There the 
Chief of Police rode on the town fire engine to fires not--
withstanding that he had been explicitly directed not to 
do so by both the Mayor and the Town Council. On one 
such adventure, he fell from the truck and was killed. 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina correctly held that 
he was not engaged in the course of his employment. 
It will be noted that nearly .all of the foregoing cases 
come from heavily industrialized states, where problems 
on Workmen's Compensation come frequently before the 
courts. It is interesting to note that the holdings of this 
court are entirely in accord with the decisions above 
cited. 
Apparently the earliest Utah decision which treats 
this question and the one most similar in point of fact, 
(.and therefore the one most helpful to this court in the 
determination of the case at bar), is Utah Copper Co. v. 
Industrial Comm., 217 Pac. 1005. In that case a brake-
man and fireman exchanged positions to equalize the 
hardships of stormy weather. Each was fully qualified 
to perform the work of the other, and the exchange was 
n1ade with the consent of the engineer. The train became 
involved in a collision, and the brakeman, while acting 
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as fireman, was killed. This court held that he had de~ 
p.arted from the scope of his employment, and his death 
was not compensable. The court quoted with approval 
from 1 Honnold on Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 114, 
as follows: 
"An accident does not arise out of the employ-
ment, if, at the time, the workman is arrogating 
to himself duties which he was neither engaged 
nor entitled to perform." 
The above rule has been consistently and repeatedly 
followed by this court in cases which have subsequently 
come before it for consider.ation and decision. 
In Salt Lake City v. Ind. Co1nm., (Ut.), 137 Pac. (2d) 
364, compensation -vvas denied to an e1nployee who in 
violation of a rule of his employer attempted to salvage 
material from the city dun1p. \\TI1ile so engaged he be:-
came engaged in an altercation with .another employee 
and was injured. 
In Buhler v. Maddison (Ut.), 166 Pac. (2d) 205, the 
di.stinction bet-vveen the doing of a prohibited act and 
the doing of a proper act in a prohibited n1anner 'vas 
noted and recognized. 
Apparently the 1nost recent decision on the subject 
in this jurisdiction, is J/. & K. Corporation v. Ind1tstrial 
(\Jnun .. (lTt.), 189 Pac. (~d) 13~. In that case a truck 
d1·iv(\l' lH'rinitted hi8 8011. 'vho "~as too young to haYe an 
OlH\rntnr'~ liePn~e, to operate his e1nployer's truck in the 
enur~P of his regular e1nployn1ent of transporting ma-
l<'rial~ for hi~ <\lnployer'~ benefit. The court held that 
thi~ "·a~ doing a proper net in a prohibited 1nanner r.ather 
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than doing a prohibited act. However, this court specifi-
cally recognized the rule, as laid down by Larson, in the 
following language : 
"Not every violation by an employee of a 
statutory provision or of a rule or regulation of 
his employer constitutes a departure from the 
course of his employment. The general rule is 
that where the employee, at the time of the acci-
dent, is engaged in doing a thing or rendering a 
service which he is employed or authorized to do, 
either expressly or by the nature of and the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances of his employ-
ment, or is doing something which is incidental 
thereto, but does such act or renders such service 
or incidental in an unlawful or forbidden manner, 
he does not thereby depart from the course of his 
employment even though the accident occurs as a 
consequence of such violation. It is only when the 
act or service which the employee is performing is 
itself prohibited, as distinguished from the man-
ner in which the act is done or the services per-
formed, that the violation of the employer takes 
the employee outside of the course of his employ-
ment and defeats a recovery." (Emphasis ours.) 
In concluding, the court observed : 
"The true test is: Was the regulation calcu-
lated to limit the scope of the employment or was 
it calculated only to govern the manner of per-
forming a more comprehensive task. * * * 
"In this respect there is room for great diver-
gence of opinion. No comprehensive, all inclu~ive 
rule has been or can be stated which will deter-
mine all cases, each case has to be determined on 
its own facts." 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that under the authorities 
above cited, and quoted, there is no room for a finding 
that the decea.sed in this case was engaged in the course 
of his employment at the time of his injuries. The record 
is clear that he was engaged in the performance of an 
act repeatedly and specifically prohibited by his em-
ployer. In undertaking to do this act, dece.ased sought 
to impose upon his employer risks for his own safety. 
which the employer had not assumed, and also the risk 
of damage to his employer's machine. Well settled prin-
ciples require that the claim be denied. 
,The order of the Industrial Commission should be 
set aside, and the Commission should be directed to enter 
an order denying the claim. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
1205 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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